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Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is an alternative to traditional techniques for public 
key cryptography. It offers smaller key size without sacrificing security level. Tate pairing is a 
bilinear map used in identity based cryptography schemes. In a typical elliptic curve 
cryptosystem, elliptic curve point multiplication is the most computationally expensive 
component.  Similarly, Tate pairing is also quite computationally expensive. Therefore, it is 
more attractive to implement the ECC and Tate pairing using hardware than using software. The 
bases of both ECC and Tate pairing are Galois field arithmetic units. In this thesis, I propose the 
FPGA implementations of the elliptic curve point multiplication in GF (2283) as well as Tate 
pairing computation on supersingular elliptic curve in GF (2283). I have designed and synthesized 
the elliptic curve point multiplication and Tate pairing module using Xilinx's FPGA, as well as 
synthesized all the Galois arithmetic units used in the designs. Experimental results demonstrate 
that the FPGA implementation can speedup the elliptic curve point multiplication by 31.6 times 
compared to software based implementation. The results also demonstrate that the FPGA 
implementation can speedup the Tate pairing computation by 152 times compared to software 
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND PREVIOUS WORK
1.1. Motivation and Objective
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and Tate pairing are two new types of public key
cryptography. Using cryptography is an efficient way to protect confidential information to
be sent over an insecure media, such as the Internet. Galois field arithmetic operations are
the bases of both elliptic curve cryptography and Tate pairing. Elliptic curve cryptography
and Tate pairing are both computationally expensive. FPGA implementation can improve
the performance of ECC and Tate pairing compared with software implementation. Mean-
while FPGA have the advantage of flexibility compared to traditional ASIC implementation.
We used resource sharing and parallel processing in our FPGA implementations of elliptic
curve cryptography and Tate pairing. Binary field Galois field arithmetics are easier to be
implemented in hardware. Therefore, our elliptic curve cryptography and Tate pairing are
based on binary field.
1.1.1. Elliptic Curve Cryptography
E-commerce has become more and more popular in recent years. According to the
Census Bureau of the US Department of Commerce, retail e-commerce sales for the fourth
quarter of 2006 was $29.3 billion [3]. Hence, the security of web transactions is extremely
important because a lot of sensitive information are transmitted over the Internet during
these transactions, e.g., credit card numbers, social security numbers, etc.
Cryptography is the most standard and efficient way to protect the security of web
transactions. It can be used to protect the confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and
non-reputation of the web transactions. There are two major categories of cryptography
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schemes, i.e., public-key cryptography and symmetric-key cryptography. In public-key cryp-
tography, the receiver and sender have their own private key and share a common public
key. In symmetric-key cryptography, the receiver and sender must have the same private
key, which makes it difficult to manage the private key. Public-key cryptography is easy for
key distribution and key management. But it is not as efficient as symmetric-key cryptogra-
phy [19, 39]. Thus, it is interesting to use dedicated hardware for public-key cryptography
to improve the performance.
A well-known public-key cryptography algorithm is RSA, which was first proposed by
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1977 [40]. The security of RSA is based on hardness of integer
factorization problem. It is commonly used in the secure sockets layer (SSL) protocol, which
is the most popular way of protecting secure web transactions nowadays. SSL runs over
transportation layer and it secures many application protocols such as HTTP, Telnet and
FTP. However, due to the performance issue of RSA, using SSL usually slows down the web
servers by three to nine times [9].
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is an efficient substitution for RSA. It was originally
proposed by Victor Miller of IBM and Neal Koblitz from the University of Washington [25,
32]. The security of ECC is based on the hardness of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
(ECDLP). ECC can improve the performance of SSL because ECC has smaller key length
yet still provides the same security level compared with RSA. Smaller key length results in
faster computation, lower power consumption, and lower memory and bandwidth. Table 1.1
shows the equivalent key sizes of ECC and RSA [17]. Currently, 1024-bit RSA is standard,
and it is projected that its size will increase to 2048 bits after 2010. The performance issues
of RSA with such a large key size will then become a dominant force, which can severely
affect the performance of RSA. So, we would like to use 283-bit ECC in place of the 2048-bit
RSA since it can significantly reduce the key length and still provides the same security level.
Despite ECC’s advantages over RSA, software based ECC implementations usually re-
quire long computation time, hence makes it difficult to be effectively utilized in real-time
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Table 1.1. Equivalent Key Sizes between ECC and RSA
ECC RSA Protection lifetime
163 1024 until 2010
283 3072 until 2030
409 7680 beyond 2031
web-based transactions. To overcome this drawback, we propose an efficient FPGA imple-
mentation of ECC over GF(2283), where GF stands for Galois Field, and 2283 means 283-bit
binary operation. The key arithmetic operation in ECC is point multiplication. It determines
the performance of the elliptic curve cryptosystem because it is the most computationally
expensive unit.
The main contribution of our FPGA based design is the resources sharing and parallel
processing optimization. The simulation results show that our implementation is significantly
faster than the software implementation as well as previous FPGA implementations with the
same security level [12, 27].
1.1.2. Tate Pairing
Identity based cryptography schemes have opened a new territory for public key cryp-
tography [8, 38, 42]. Using identity based cryptography schemes, a sender can derive the
public key of a receiver without receiving the certificate of the receiver issued by a certificate
authority (CA). The public key can be derived from the identity of the receiver such as the
email or IP address. Pairing over elliptic curve can be used to construct the identity based
cryptography schemes. It is a map from two points on the elliptic curve to another multi-
plicative group. It has special properties of bilinearity. Currently, the most commonly used
pairing methods are Tate pairing [13] and Weil pairing [31]. Originally, Weil pairing was used
to attack public key cryptosystems. Later it was used for pairing based cryptosystems. It
can be computed using either Miller algorithm [33] or modified Miller’s algorithms [6, 7, 26].
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Tate pairing is more efficient than Weil pairing because it requires one application of Miller’s
algorithm instead of two and it allows a host of optimizations [1]. Tate pairing is more than
two times faster than Weil pairing [14]. Currently, Tate pairing computation is the most pop-
ular method used in many identity based cryptography schemes [8, 38, 42]. However, Tate
pairing is computationally expensive, which makes it difficult to be efficiently implemented
using software. We design and implement Tate pairing using field programmable gate array
(FPGA) over binary field GF(2m). It is more efficient for hardware implementation over
binary field compared with other fields such as cubic field GF(3m) [47]. The main arithmetic
units needed for the Tate pairing computation include addition, Galois field multiplication,
Galois field squaring, and Galois field inversion.
Our proposed FPGA implementation of the Tate pairing computation is in GF(2283). We
design the top level architecture for Tate pairing in order to optimize resources sharing. The
simulation results show that our FPGA based implementation is faster than the software
implementation as well as previous hardware implementations [24, 30].
1.1.3. Advantage of FPGA Implementation
We choose FPGA implementation because it can improve the performance of ECC and
Tate pairing through resource sharing and parallel processing compared to software imple-
mentation. Meanwhile, FPGA implementation has the advantage of flexibility compared to
ASIC implementation. For instance, using FPGA, the curve parameters for ECC and Tate
pairing can be reconfigured. FPGA implementation is also suitable for hybrid private and
public key scheme. For example, SSL may use ECC as public key cryptography, and AES
as symmetric key cryptography. FPGA can configure the proper cryptographic schemes and
sharing the resources.
1.2. Contribution
The contributions of this thesis are outlined as follows:
• Investigation of the applications for ECC and Tate pairing.
• Design a hardware architecture for elliptic curve cryptography.
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• Design a hardware architecture for Tate pairing.
• FPGA implementation of elliptic curve cryptography.
• FPGA implementation of Tate pairing.
1.3. Previous Work
1.3.1. Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Hardware implementation of ECC has better performance than software implementa-
tion. Existing hardware implementations vary in the following aspects: GF(2m), GF(p), key
lengths (from 163 bits to 233 bits), platforms (FPGA, ASIC, sensor). In this section, we
review some of the FPGA implementations of ECC over GF(2m).
Orlando and Paar designed a reconfigurable elliptic curve processor (ECP) over GF(2167) [35].
The ECP consists of main controller, arithmetic unit controller and arithmetic units. The
point multiplication can be computed in 0.21 ms using the Montgomery algorithm. This work
is generally considered as the benchmark of FPGA implementation of ECC. Its main advan-
tages include scalable hardware architecture and reprogrammable processing units. Sandoval
and Uribe proposed a hardware architecture that can perform three different ECC algo-
rithms, i.e. elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), elliptic curve digital signature (ECDSA),
elliptic curve integrated encryption scheme (ECIES) [34]. The main functional units in their
cryptosystem are: coprocessor for scalar multiplication, random number generator, algo-
rithms modules, and main controller. Its scalar multiplication can be completed in 4.7 ms
for GF(2191). Ernst et al. presented a generator based elliptic curve cryptosystem in [12].
The generator program can create customized VHDL netlists according to different key sizes
and multiplier radix. Thus, this work is flexible in validating the correctness of the design.
The authors chose Massey-Omura finite field multiplier, and Double-and-add algorithm for
point multiplication. Their point multiplication can be computed in 6.85 ms for GF(2270).
Later, Leung et al. presented a microcoded FPGA based elliptic curve processor [27], which
is similar to that presented in [12]. This design is parameterized for arbitrary key sizes and it
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allows for rapid development of different control flows. They used normal basis for the Galois
field operations and the point multiplication can be computed in 14.3 ms for GF(2281).
In addition to the hardware implementations discussed above, there exist other FPGA
implementations for binary field in literature, such as [4, 11, 15, 21, 41, 43, 46]. A survey
study conducted by Dormale and Quisquater is presented in [10], which summaries these
FPGA based implementations.
1.3.2. Tate pairing
Tate pairing is relatively a new topic in cryptography. Thus, there are not many existing
hardware implementations of it. The existing implementations also vary from characteristics
(GF(2m), GF(3m), GF(p)), elliptic curve types (supersingular, non-supersingular, different
embedded degrees). In this section, we briefly review some hardware implementations for
supersingular elliptic curve over GF(2283).
McCusker et al. designed Tate pairing over GF(2283) [30]. The authors used the algo-
rithm proposed by Kwon’s [26]. They implemented Galois field multiplication, squaring,
exponentiation and inversion. In addition, they used Karatsuba’s algorithm [36] for the
Galois field multiplication in GF(24m).
Keller et al. also used Karatsuba algorithm for the Galois field multiplier in GF(24m) [24].
Karatsuba algorithm uses GF(2m) multiplier to realize the GF(24m) multiplier. They used
a digit-serial architecture to design the GF(2m) multiplier [48].
Shu et al. used two modified Kwon’s algorithms in [45, 47]. They designed squaring,
multiplication, inverter and exponentiation. In addition, they made use of a digit-serial
multiplier in the design. Their implementation can compute the Tate pairing over GF(2283)
quickly. The algorithm used for Tate pairing in [47] is different from [24, 30]. In our work,
we implemented the algorithms used in [30].
1.3.3. Other Implementations
In this section, we select some ASIC implementations and sensor implementations of
elliptic curve cryptography.
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1.3.3.1. ASIC Implementations. Akashi Satoh and Kohji Takano presented a processor
that can support both prime and binary finite field for arbitrary prime numbers and irre-
ducible polynomials [44]. This characteristic is achieved by introducing a dual field multiplier.
A Montgomery multiplier with an optimized data bus and an on-the-fly redundant binary
converter boost the throughput of the EC scalar multiplication. All popular cryptographic
functions such as DSA, EC-DSA, RSA, CRT, and prime generation are also supported.
Scalar multiplication can be performed in 0.19 ms in the binary field F2160 .
Fabio Sozzani et al. presented a hardware implementation of ECC that includes some
parallelism to maximize the usage of the field function units [49]. They combined the
Double&ADD algorithm with the Montgomery algorithm to compute two different kP scalar
multiplications in parallel. They have carried out modifications of the scheduling to syn-
chronize the Control Units according to the availability of resources. The coprocessor is
synthesized in 0.13 µm CMOS technology (VLSI CMOS9 library, STMicroelectronics). For
163-bit points, the scalar multiplication can be completed in 0.027 ms on average of two
independent kP scalar multiplications.
1.3.3.2. Sensor Implementations. David J. Malan et al. presented the first known im-
plementation of elliptic curve cryptography over F2p for sensor networks based on the 8-bit,
7.3828-MHz MICA2 mote [29]. Using instrumentation of UC Berkeley’s TinySec module,
the authors argued that there was a need for an efficient, secure mechanism for distribution
of secret keys among nodes. And through their analysis of the implementation for TinyOS
of multiplication of points on elliptic curves, public-key infrastructure is viable for TinySec
key’s distribution. They demonstrated that public keys can be generated within 34 seconds,
and that shared secrets can be distributed among nodes in a sensor network within the same,
using just over 1 kilobyte of SRAM and 34 kilobytes of ROM. Polynomial base is used for
the implementation. The key size is 163-bit.
Haodong Wang et al. described a public-key implementation of access control in a sensor
network [51]. The authors implemented elliptic curve cryptography over primary field, a
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public-key cryptography scheme. Their implementations are conducted on TelosB mote
(TPR2400), which is the latest product in the Mote family. The experiment results show
that the fixed point multiplication can be completed in 3.13 seconds and random point
multiplication can be completed in 3.51 seconds. The digital signature can be completed in
3.35 seconds. And all these implementations are based on 160-bit elliptic curve.
1.4. Thesis outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide the background
for ECC and Tate paring. In Chapter 3, we cover the main applications of ECC and Tate
pairing. In Chapter 4, we discuss the detailed designs of the Galois field arithmetic units. In
Chapter 5, we present the algorithms and architectures for ECC and Tate pairing, including
the experimental results and comparisons of our implementations and previous implementa-





2.1.1. Symmetric Key Cryptography
There are two main categories of cryptography. One is symmetric key cryptography, the
other is public key cryptography. The basic encryption/decryption scheme of symmetric key
cryptography is shown in Figure 2.1 [50]. In Figure 2.1, plaintext is the original form of
the message that sender wants to send to recipient. Ciphertext is the encrypted form of
the original message which can be transmitted in an insecure channel such as Internet. The
sender and recipient use the same secret key for the encryption and decryption function.





Figure 2.1. Symmetric Key Encryption/Decryption Scheme
2.1.2. Public Key Cryptography
The basic encryption/decryption scheme of public key cryptography is shown in Fig-
ure 2.2 [50]. The senders use recipient’s public key for encryption. The recipient can decrypt
the ciphertext using his own private key. In symmetric key cryptography, each pair of sender
and recipient have a secret key. In public key cryptography, only the sender’s public key is









Figure 2.2. Public Key Encryption/Decryption Scheme
2.1.3. Digital Signature
The basic scheme of digital signature is shown in Figure 2.3 [50]. Just like the physical
signature in the real life, digital signature is used to ensure the unforgeable identity of the
singer. Digital signature is a reversal of the public key encryption/decryption scheme in
Figure 2.2. Firstly, the sender can create a message identifying himself such as ‘I am Harry’.
Secondly, the sender can encrypt the identity message using his private key to create a digital
signature. Then the digital signature can be transmitted to the recipient via Internet. After
receiving the digital signature, the recipient can decrypt the digital signature using sender’s
public key. Finally, the recipient gets the identity message ’I am Harry’. The digital signature









Figure 2.3. Digital Signature Scheme
2.1.4. Digital Envelopes
Digital envelope is a combination of symmetric key cryptography and public key cryp-
tography technology. It improves the performance of the cryptosystem since the public
key cryptography is relatively slow. The basic scheme of digital envelope is shown in Fig-
ure 2.4 [50]. In the digital envelope, the sender uses symmetric key cryptography to encrypt
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the plaintext with the session key. The session key is a generated secrete key usually used
for one session. Then the sender uses public key cryptography to encrypt the session key
with recipient’s public key, which creates the digital envelop. Finally, the sender sends the
ciphertext of the original messages and digital envelop to the recipient. In the recipient’s
side, the digital envelope is first decrypted to derive the session key. Then the recipient can























Figure 2.4. Digital Envelope
2.2. ECC
2.2.1. Group Law
In our design, we use points on the non-supersingular elliptic curve over GF(2m) for point
multiplication, point addition and point doubling. This is because non-supersingular elliptic
curve provides the highest level of security [12]. The curve we choose has the following
characteristic as defined in Equation (1).
(1) E : y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b
where a, b ∈ GF(2m). The points on E(GF(2m)) include all the points satisfying Equation
(1) and an identity point ∞. Let P = (x1, y1), Q = (x2, y2) ∈ E(GF (2
m)), where P 6= ±Q
and P 6= −P . The group law of points in E(GF(2m)) can be depicted as following [19]:
• Identity: P +∞ =∞+ P = P .
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• Negatives: −P = (x1, x1 + y1).
• Point addition: P + Q = (x3, y3), where x3 = λ
2 + λ + x1 + x2 + a, and y3 =
λ(x1 + x3) + x3 + y1 with λ = (y1 + y2)/(x1 + x2).
• Point doubling: 2P = (x3, y3), where x3 = λ
2 + λ + a = x21 + b/x
2
1, and y3 =
x21 + λx3 + x3 with λ = x1 + y1/x1.
Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 show the geometric illustrations of point addition and point
doubling on an elliptic curve respectively [45]. We can see that the results of addition and
doubling of elliptic curve points are also on that curve.
Figure 2.5. Point Addition: P + Q = R [45]
2.2.2. Projective Coordinates
According to the group law of points on elliptic curve E, we can see that both point
addition and point doubling need a Galois field inversion. Galois field inversion is much
more expensive than Galois field multiplication. Using projective coordinates can eliminate
the use of Galois field inversion in point addition and point doubling. The point addition
and point doubling in projective coordinates can be computed as following [28]:
12
Figure 2.6. Point Doubling: P + P = R [45]
• Point addition in projective coordinates:
(2) Z3 = (X1 · Z2 + X2 · Z1)
2
(3) X3 = x · Z3 + (X1 · Z2) · (X2 · Z1)
where (X3, Z3) is the result of the point addition in projective coordinate, and
(X1, Z1) (X2, Z2) are the projective coordinates of P and Q, respectively.
• Point doubling in projective coordinates:
(4) Z = X41 + b · Z
4
1
(5) X = Z21 ·X
2
1
where (X, Z) is the result of the point doubling in projective coordinates, and
(X1, Z1) is the projective coordinates of P .
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2.2.3. Security of ECC
The security of ECC is based on the hardness of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
(ECDLP) [34]. ECDLP is to find d, given points P, Q on the elliptic curve, where Q = dP .
2.3. Tate pairing
2.3.1. Groups
We need to define some concepts in groups theory. First we define additive group. For
any two points P, Q ∈ group G, if P + Q ∈ G, then group G is an additive group. There is
a negative point of P , i.e. −P . And P + (−P ) = 0. 0 is zero element of the additive group.
Additive group is also abelian group, that means the order of the addition doesn’t matter,
i.e. P + Q = Q + P . Multiplication aP = P + P + · · ·+ P
︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
, which means P adds to itself a
times. An example for the additive group is the addition modulo.
Next we define multiplicative group. It’s similar to additive group. For any two points
X, Y ∈ group H, if XẎ ∈ H, then group H is a multiplicative group. XẊ−1 = 1, Here
1 is the identity element of the multiplicative group. And a multiplicative group is abelian
group if X · Y = Y ·X. Exponentiation Xn = X ·X · · · ·X
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
, here multiplication repeats n
times. An example for the multiplicative group is multiplication modulo.
The additive group and multiplicative group will be used in the pairing.
2.3.2. Pairing
Pairing can be regarded as a function to map points from an additive group to a multi-
plicative group. Let G1 be an additive group with q elements. q is also called the order of
the group. Let q be a large prime. Let P ∈ G1 and P be a non zero point, then qP = inf.
P, 2P, 3P, ...(q − 1)P, aP = inf is the set of all the q elements of group G1. P is also called
a generator of G1. Let G2 be a multiplicative group also with q elements. Pairing can be
defined as a function e:
(6) G1 ×G1 → G2
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Function e maps two points in G1 to one point in G2. And pairing has some very special
properties, which are called bi-linearity. This means that, given any Q, R, S ∈ G1, we have
(7) e(Q, R + S) = e(Q, R) · e(Q, S).
(8) e(Q + R, S) = e(q, S) · e(R, S).
Here, addition in the left part of the equation is addition in additive group G1. Multiplication
in the right part of the equation is multiplication in multiplicative group G2. We can use
the equation 7 and equation 8 to further derive new equations.
e(2P, P ) = e(P + P, P ) = e(p, p) · e(p, p) = e(p, p)2 = e(P, P + P ) = e(P, 2P )
Similarly, we can get e(3P, P ) = e(P, P )3 = e(P, 3P ). Therefore, we have
(9) e(aP, bP ) = e(P, P )ab = e(abP, P ) = e(P, abP )
This is a very important equation for use in the pairing based cryptography. We will see
how it is used in the applications later.
2.3.3. Elliptic Curves
We can’t pick any kinds of additive group for pairing use. Elliptic curves are a good
candidate for the additive group. Elliptic curves have been used for public key cryptogra-
phy. It is believed that elliptic curve cryptography is more efficient than other public key
cryptography such as RSA and El Gamal in term of the key length. A 160 bits key length
in elliptic curve cryptography is comparable to a 1024 bits in RSA in terms of the security.
A general form of elliptic curve over a finite field Fq can be expressed as Weierstrass form:
(10) Y 2 + a1XY + a3Y = X
3 + a2X
2 + a4X + a6
Here all the coordinates a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 is in the finite field Fq. Finite field is also called
Galois field, it means a field that contains finitely numbers of elements. Usually people use
binary field F2m or prime field Fp in the elliptic curve cryptography. Binary field is more
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efficient for the hardware implementation. Therefore, we use binary field in this thesis. For
security reason, people want to choose m as odd or prime.
There are different kinds of elliptic curves. One is called supersingular elliptic curve,
the other is called non-supersigular elliptic curve. Supersingular elliptic curve is usually
considered as dangerous for cryptography use. But recent research shows with careful use,
supersingular elliptic curves can be used in the pairing based cryptography. To our best
understanding, most of the papers in pairing based cryptosystem use supersingular elliptic
curves.
There are more mathematical definitions we need to know. First we define the embedding
degree k. Embedding degree can be also called as security multiplier. It is an integer, and
it is the minimal degree of the extension satisfying E[l] ⊂ E(Fqk). Here l is positive integer.
E[l] means the set of points on elliptic curve E, and lP = ∞, P ∈ E(Fq). There are
two commonly used supersingular elliptic curves in pairing based cryptography. One is
Y 2 + Y = X3 + X + b, b ∈ 0, 1. The other is Y 2 + Y = X3. The first one has embedded
degree of 4, and the later one has embedded degree of 2. In this thesis, we use supersingular
elliptic curve:
(11) Eb : Y
2 + Y = X3 + X + 1
So points on Eb is the additive group G1 in the equation 6. Therefore, we will need elliptic
curve addition, elliptic curve double, point multiplication in G1. Also finite field multiplica-
tion for G2. We will use projective coordinate for the elliptic curve computations. Detailed
arithmetic of elliptic curve will be introduced later.
2.3.4. Security of Pairing
The security of many pairing based cryptosystems is based on the hardness of Bi-linear
Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP) [37]. BDHP is defined as: Given four points in group
G1, say P, Q = aP, R = bP, S = cP , compute e(P, P )
abc. Here we only know the points
P, Q, R, S, but we don’t know the value of a, b, c. This makes BDHP a hard problem. Many
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pairing based cryptography schemes based on the BDHP. If someone can solve BDHP, then
pairing based cryptosystem will be cracked.
In addition to BDHP, there are some other problems related to it. First is Computational
Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP). CDHP is defined as: Given points P, Q = aP, R = bP ∈
G1, compute T = abP . Here a, b are also unknown. This is also a hard problem. It is shown
by mathematicians that if G1 is well chosen and the size of G1 is the order of 2
160, then
CDHP is computational infeasible. And we can also prove that BDHP is no harder than
CDHP. This means if CDHP can be solved, then BDHP can be solved. Next we will prove
this. If CDHP is solved, that means given Q = aP, R = bP in group G1, we can compute
T = abP . Then using equation 9, we can get:
e(T, S)⇒ e(P, P )abc
This means that BDHP is also solved. Therefore, we proved that BDHP is no harder than
CDHP.
In addition to CDHP, Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is another hard problem related
to BDHP. DLP is defined as: Given points P, Q = aP ∈ G1, compute a. Actually, the
security of elliptic curve cryptography is based on DLP. Similar to CDHP, we can also prove
that BDHP is no harder than DLP. If DLP is solved, BDHP is also solved. Next we prove
this. If given P, Q = aP in group G1, we can compute a. Similarly, given P, R = bP ∈ G1,
we can also compute b. If we know both a and b, we can easily compute T = abP using
point multiplication. This means that CDHP is solved. In turn, BDHP is solved. Therefore,
we proved that BDHP is no harder than DLP.
17
CHAPTER 3
APPLICATIONS OF ECC AND TATE PAIRING IN CRYPTOGRAPHY
3.1. Applications of ECC
3.1.1. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
The goal of Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange protocol is to establish
a secret session key between two parties over an insecure channel [19]. The two parties,
Alice and Bob, want to establish a secret key without Oscar (the adversary) being able to
compute this key. Alice and Bob first agree on a (non-secret) elliptic curve and a (non-secret)
fixed curve point F. Alice chooses a secret random integer Ak which is her secret key, and
publishes the curve point AP = Ak * F as her public key. Bob does the same: BP = Bk *
F. Then Alice send her public key AP to Bob, Bob can compute the session key using his
secret key: session key = Bk * AP = Bk * (Ak * F) = Ak * (Bk * F) = Ak * BP. This means
Alice can also compute the session key using her secret key and the public key of Bob. And
the security of this scheme relies on the discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curve, i.e. it
is difficult to compute k given F and k*F.
3.1.2. Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is used to generate a digital signa-
ture for a message. The ECDSA signature generation scheme is shown in Algorithm 1 [19].
The ECDSA signature verification scheme is shown in Algorithm 2 [19].
In Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, the domain parameters D = (q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h) are
composed of:
• q: field order
• FR: field representation
• S: seed to randomly generate the coefficients of the elliptic curve
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Algorithm 1 ECDSA signature generation
INPUT: Domain parameters D = (q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h), private key d, message m.
OUTPUT: Signature (r, s).
1. Select a random number k from [1, n− 1]
2. Compute kP = (x, y) and r = x mod n. If r = 0, go to step 1.
3. Compute s = k−1(H(m) + dr) mod n. If s = 0 then go to step 1.
return (r, s).
Algorithm 2 ECDSA signature verification
INPUT: Domain parameters D = (q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h), public key Q, message m, signa-
ture (r, s).
OUTPUT: Signature Accepted or Rejected.
1. Verify r and s are integers in [1, n− 1]. If fails, finish and reject the signature.
2. Compute w = s−1 mod n and H(m).
3. Compute u1 = H(m)w mod n and u2 = rw mod n.
4. Compute X = u1P + u2Q = (x2, y2).
5. Compute v = x2 mod n, accept the signature if and only if v = r.
• a, b: coefficients of the elliptic curve
• P : base point
• n: order of P
• h: cofactor h = #E(Fq)/n
We can prove the correctness of the ECDSA using mathematic inductions. If the signa-
ture is made by a legal user, then s ≡ k−1(e + dr) (mod n). This means
k ≡ s−1(e + dr) ≡ s−1e + s−1dr ≡ we + wrd = u1 + u2d (mod n).
Thus,
X = u1P + u2Q




Where, X = (x2, y2). r = x mod n and v = x2 mod n. Hence, we get r = v.
3.1.3. ECC based SSL
Secure socket level (SSL) is the most widely used protocol for secure web transactions
nowadays. SSL can provide authentication, encryption of the sensitive data. In addition,
SSL is very flexible. It can adopt different protocols for key exchange, encryption, and
hashing. A combination of the protocols used in SSL is called cipher suite. For example,
RSA-RC4-SHA is a cipher suite, which uses RSA as the public key cryptography, RC4 as
symmetric key cryptography, and SHA as hashing function. Public key cryptography is used
for key exchange because it’s easy for key management and key distribution. But public key
cryptography is very computationally expensive. Therefore, people usually uses symmetric
key for data encryption.
There are two components in SSL, i.e. handshake protocol and record layer protocol.
Handshake protocol uses public key cryptography to agree on a cipher suite, to do key
exchange between client and server. A master secret (session key) is established after the
handshake protocol. It can also be used to authenticate the client and server. Record
layer protocol uses symmetric key cryptography to encrypt the data. Therefore, public key
cryptography is mainly used in handshake protocol of the SSL. In the next subsection, we
introduce the RSA-based handshake and the ECC-based handshake.
3.1.4. RSA-based Handshake and ECC-based Handshake
RSA-based handshake is the most commonly used handshake for SSL now. The oper-
ations of RSA-based handshake is shown in Figure 3.1. The client and sever negotiate the
cipher suite using ClientHello message and ServerHello message. Then server sends its RSA
public key to the client. Client verifies the server’s public key and encrypt a premaster
key with server’s public key and sends the premaster key back to the server. Server can
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decrypt the premaster key using its private key. Therefore, both client and server can use






















 key and sends encrypted
random secret: r e mod n)
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Figure 3.1. RSA-based SSL Handshake [18].
The ECC-based handshake is shown in Figure 3.2. The procedure of ECC-based hand-
shake is similar to that of RSA-based handshake. First the client and server negotiate a
cipher suite, e.g., ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-128-SHA. Then the server sends its public key to the
client. The public key can be signed using ECDSA by a certificate authority. Then the client
verifies the server’s public key and sends its own public key to the server. Both client and
server can use their own private key to create the shared premaster key now.
3.1.4.1. Comparisons. The public-key cryptographic operations in the two modes de-
scribed above are shown in Table 3.1. For RSA-based handshake, the client performs one
RSA verification operation to verify the authentication of the server, and one RSA encryp-
tion to encrypt the premaster key. The server performs one RSA decryption to get the
premaster key. For ECC-based handshake, the client performs one ECDSA to verify the
authentication of the server, and one ECDH to create the shared premaster key. The server
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Figure 3.2. ECC-based SSL Handshake [18].
Table 3.1. Public-key Cryptographic Operations in an SSL Handshake [18]
RSA ECDH-ECDSA
Client RSAverfiy ECDSAverify + ECDHop
Server RSAdecrypt ECDHop
The performance evaluation of the RSA-based SSL handshake and ECC-based SSL hand-
shake is shown in Table 3.2. Gupta et. al performed two different cipher suites for the evalua-
tion, i.e., TLS-RSA-RC4-128-SHA and TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-128-SHA [18]. They tested
different security levels for RSA and ECC operations, including 1024, 1536, 2048 bits RSA,
and 160,192,224 bits ECC. The authors used http-load to send multiple HTTPS requests
simultaneously. Then they used OpenSSL speed command to measure the RSA and ECC
operations.
The time in Table 3.2 means first response time. It is the delay between starting and SSL
handshake and receiving the first packet in the HTTPS response. It can be used to estimate
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the latency for the user to get the first response after clicking the URL. The ops/sec in the
performance evaluation is the rate that the server can satisfy web page requests. We can see
from the Table 3.2 that the performance of ECC-based SSL is better than RSA-based SSL
in all three different security level. The higher the security level, the better performance
advantage of ECC-based SSL over RSA-based SSL. Therefore, it’s beneficial to replace RSA
with ECC in SSL protocol.
Table 3.2. Performance Evaluation [18]
ECC-160 RSA-1024 ECC-192 RSA-1536 ECC-224 RSA-2048
Time (ms) 3.69 8.75 3.87 27.47 5.12 56.18
Ops/sec 271.3 114.3 258.1 36.4 195.5 17.8
Performance ratio 2.4:1 7.1:1 11:1
Key-size ration 1:6.4 1:8 1:9.1
3.2. Applications of Tate pairing
3.2.1. Tripartite Key Agreement
Tripartite key agreement is also known as three parties Diffie-Hellman key agreement. It
is an extension of two parties Diffie-Hellman key agreement. The goal of two parties Diffie-
Hellman key agreement protocol is to establish a secret session key between two parties over
an insecure channel. The two parties, Alice and Bob, want to establish a secret key without
Oscar (the adversary) being able to compute this key. Alice and Bob first agree on a (non-
secret) elliptic curve and a (non-secret) fixed curve point P . Alice chooses a secret random
integer a which is her secret key, and publishes the curve point AP = a ·P as her public key.
Bob does the same: BP = b·P . Then Alice send her public key AP to Bob, Bob can compute
the session key using his secret key: session key = b ·AP = b · (a · P ) = a · (b · P ) = a ·BP .
This means Alice can also compute the session key using her secret key and the public key
23
of Bob. And the security of this scheme relies on the discrete logarithm problem for elliptic
curve, i.e. it is difficult to compute k given P and k · P . Here · is point multiplication over
the elliptic curve.
Tripartite Diffie-Hellman key agreement is just an extension of the two parties Diffie-
Hellman key agreement. There are three parties A, B, C. We need to find the minimal
communications among these three parties to establish a common session key among them.
For a naive tripartite key agreement protocol, we will need six steps:
(i) A→ B, C : aP (mod r)
(ii) B → A, C : bP (mod r)
(iii) C → A, B : cP (mod r)
(iv) A→ B, C : abP, acP (mod r)
(v) B → A, C : abP, bcP (mod r)
(vi) C → A, B : acP, bcP (mod r)
Here, P is a point on elliptic curve that three parties agreed. a is the secrete key of A,
b is the secrete key of B, and c is the secrete key of C. r is a reduction polynomial for
the modulo computation. The rightarrow → means broadcast messages sequentially. For
example, A → B, C : abP, acP (mod r) means that party A sends abP and acP to both
B and C. After these six steps in naive three parties key agreement, party A, B, and C
can compute abcP . Therefore abcP is the common session key for these three parties. The
security of the naive tripartite Diffie-Hellman key agreement is still based on the hardness
of discrete logarithm problem.
A more advanced tripartite Diffie-Hellman key agreement based on pairing is proposed
by Joux [22]. It only requires the first three steps of the naive tripartite DH key agreement.
And it is the minimal steps of the tripartite DH key agreement because each party needs
to send their public key at least once. The tripartite DH key agreement by Joux is shown
below.
(i) A→ B, C : aP (mod r)
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(ii) B → A, C : bP (mod r)
(iii) C → A, B : cP (mod r)
A, B, C just broadcast once to the other parties. And using the bilinearity of pairing, i.e.
equation 9, A, B, and C can all compute the common key. The processes are shown below.
A : e(bP, cP )a = e(P, P )abc
B : e(aP, cP )b = e(P, P )abc
C : e(aP, bP )c = e(P, P )abc
Therefore, the session key for party A, B, C is e(P, P )abc in Joux’s tripartite DH key agree-
ment. The security of it is based on the hardness of BDHP.
3.2.2. Identity-Based Key Agreement
The second example of pairing application is identity-based key agreement proposed by
Sakai [42]. The difference between the identity-based key agreement and Diffie-Hellman
based key agreement is that in identity-based key agreement, part A doesn’t need to com-
municate with part B directly. Part A just needs to know the identity of part B, and vice
versa. But in the identity-based key agreement, both A and B need to preregister with a
trusted authority (TA) in ahead. There is a harsh function H being used here. H is a public
function which can convert an arbitrary string to an element in the additive group G1 shown
as below.
QA = H(IDA) ∈ G1
QB = H(IDB) ∈ G1
Here QA and QB are all public information derived from the identity of A and B. The
identity of A and B can be their email addresses or IP addresses. In our cases, QA and QB
are the points on the supersingular elliptic curve. TA will select a secret integer s. Then TA
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computes sQA and sends it to A. Similarly, TA computes sQB and sends it to B. Then using
the bilinear property shown as below, both A and B can compute the common session key.
(12) e(SQA, QB) = e(QA, QB)
s = e(QA, sQB)
A knows sQA from TA and QB = H(IDB) from the identity of B. Therefore, A can compute
the common key e(QA, QB)
s. Similarly, B knows sQB and QA = H(IDA), so B can also
compute the common key e(QA, QB)
s.
Similar to the tripartite key agreement, the security of the identity-based key agreement
is also based on the hardness of BDHP. But an extra vulnerability here is TA. Since TA
knows the secret integer s, QA and QB, TA can compute the common session key. So A, B
must trust TA. TA can’t disclose the secrets to the adversary or being eavesdropped by the
adversary. Otherwise, the security of the identity-based key agreement is gone.
3.2.3. Identity-Based Encryption
The third example is identity-based encryption (IBE) proposed by Boneh and Franklin
[8] in 2001. This opens a new area for the public key cryptography, which is called identity-
based public key cryptography (ID-PKC). For traditional public key infrastructure (PKI),
a certificate authority (CA) is needed to verify the authentication of the public keys. For
IBE, CA is not needed.
For the identity-based encryption, we need a trusted authority to choose the system
parameters for IBE. The system parameters are shown in the following list.
• G1: additive group
• G2: multiplicative group
• e: pairing function
• s: system-wide master secret
• P : one point in group G1
• Ppub: Ppub = sP ∈ G1, it’s a point multiplication on elliptic curve
• H: harsh function that can convert an arbitrary string to an element in G1
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• H1: harsh function that can convert an element in G2 to a string of length k. Here
k is the length of the plaintext.
G1, G2, e, P, Ppub are all public information. In addition to the system parameters, the IDs
of users are also public. IDs can be email, name, IP address and so on. Next we will show
how the IBE works.
Suppose user A needs to send some encrypted message to user B. The secret key of user A
is sQA, which is generated by TA. Here QA = H(IDA). First user B encrypts the plaintext.
Let M be a k bit plaintext. B chooses a secret key r first. Then user B computes:
U = rP ∈ G1
V = M ⊕H1(e(QA, Ppub)
r)
The encryption process needs point multiplication in group G1, xor operation, and pairing
computation. The ciphertext that user B sends to user A is < U, V >.
A decrypts the ciphertext using the bilinear property shown as blow.
(13) e(QA, Ppub)
r = e(QA, sP )
r = e(QA, P )
rs = e(sQA, rP )
The process of decryption is shown below.
(i) A gets the secret key sQA from TA
(ii) A gets the first part of the ciphertext U = rP
(iii) A computes W = H1(e(QA, Ppub)
r)
(iv) A gets the plaintext M = W ⊕ V
Here, since e(QA, Ppub)
r = e(sQA, rP ) = e(sQA, U), W can be computed using pairing. We
can see from the above encryption steps, user B only needs the identity of user A, which is
IDA, as well as the system parameters. Similar to the previous applications, the security of
the identity-based encryption is also based on the hardness of BDHP.
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3.2.4. Identity-based Signature schemes
Another application example of pairing in identity-based cryptography is identity-based
signature scheme proposed by Paterson [38] in 2002. It is similar to the identity-based
encryption scheme. We still need a TA, and TA will choose a set of system parameters just
like that in identity-based encryption. The system parameters include additive group G1,
multiplicative group G2, pairing function e, one point P in G1, and public key Ppub = sP ,
where s is the system master secret. In addition to these parameters, we still need three harsh
functions. Harsh function H can convert arbitrary string to an element in G1. Harsh function
H2 can convert arbitrary strings into integers. Harsh function H3 can convert elements in
G1 into integers.
Suppose user A want to sign a message M. A first register with TA, and TA will send
the private key sQA to A, where QA = sH(IDA). Then A picks a random integer r. The
signature is the pair shown below.
(14) < U = rP, V = r−1(H2(M)P + H3(U)sQA) >
Here, r−1 is the inverse modulo, which means r−1 · r = 1(mod q). q is the reduction
polynomial. The signature is just the pair < U, V > computed by A. We can see that there
is no pairing computation in the signing procedure. Therefore, the signing procedure can be
very fast.
The verify procedure is to compute the pairing of < U, V >, and compare the results
with e(P, P )H2(M) · e(Ppub, QA)
H3(U). This is also due to the bilinear property of the pairing
computation. The proof is shown below.
e(U, V ) = e(rP, r−1(H2(M)P + H3(U)sQA))
= e(P, H2(M)P + H3(U)sQA)
= e(P, H2(M)P ) · e(sP, H3(U)QA)
= e(P, P )H2(M) · e(Ppub, QA)
H3(U)
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For the verifying procedure, we will need pairing computations. The security of the identity-
based signature is also based on the hardness of BDHP.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLEMENTATIONS OF GALOIS FIELD ARITHMETIC UNITS
4.1. Adder in Galois field
The addition unit in Galois field is straightforward to implement over binary field. It can
be designed using an array of XOR gates. This is one of advantages of implementing the
Tate pairing computation over binary field.
4.2. Squarer in GF(2283)
We have designed a bit parallel squarer which is much faster than multiplying two binary
polynomials [52]. Assume the binary polynomial is a(x) =
∑282
i=0 aix
i, then the squaring






Because we use f(x) = x283 + x12 + x7 + x5 + 1 as the reduction polynomial, we can obtain
the formula of the coefficients of a(x)2 by replacing x283 by x12 + x7 + x5 + 1. Therefore, the
squarer is simply a set of XOR arrays to recombine the coefficients of a(x). And the gate
count is proportional to the polynomial bit [47], which is 283 in our case.
4.3. Multiplier in GF(2283)
Multiplication is a basic computation for Tate pairing computation. There are many
algorithms for computing it. We introduce the most significant bit first (MSB) multiplier
and the digital serial multiplier here.
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4.3.1. MSB Multiplier
The MSB multiplier algorithm [19] for F2m is shown in Algorithm 3. It is suitable for
hardware implementation and it’s area efficient. It consists of shift operations and xor
operations, which can both be easily implemented in hardware.
Algorithm 3 MSB Algorithm
INPUT: a = (am−1, ..., a1, a0), b = (bm−1, ..., b1, b0) ∈ F2m , r = (rm−1, ..., r1, r0) ∈ F2m is a
part of reduction polynomial f(z) = zm + r(z)
OUTPUT: c = a · b, c = (cm−1, ..., c1, c0) ∈ F2m
INITIAL: c = 0
for i = m− 1 downto 0 do
c = cm−1r + leftshift(c).
c = c + bia.
end for
return c
4.3.2. Digit Serial Multiplier
We use the digit serial multiplier introduced in [19]. The advantage of this digit serial
multiplier over MSB multiplier is that it can increase the speed of the multiplication opera-
tion. The digit serial multiplier requires to use a reduction module. The algorithm to design
the digit serial multiplier is shown in Algorithm 4.
In Algorithm 4, l = dm/ke, k is the digit size, and l is the number of digits. In our
implementation, we set m = 283, k = 32, l = 9. Using the digit serial multiplier can improve
the performance of the Galois field multiplier compared to bit serial multiplier.
4.4. Reduction in GF(2283)
The reduction function is used in designing multiplier. We adopt the fast reduction
modulo algorithm with digit size of 32 in our implementation [19]. The pseudocode is shown
in Algorithm 5.
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i ∈ GF(2m), b =
∑l−1
i=0 Biz
ki ∈ GF(2m), reduction polynomial f(z).
OUTPUT: c = a · b.
Set c = 0
for i = 0 to l − 1 do
c = c + Bia.
a = a · zk mod f(z).
end for
return c mod f(z).
Algorithm 5 Fast reduction modulo f(x) = x283 + x12 + x7 + x5 + 1 in GF(2283) (with
W = 32)
INPUT: A binary polynomial c(z) of degree at most 564.
OUTPUT: c(z) mod f(z).
for i = 17 downto 9 do
T = C[i].
C[i− 9] = c[i− 9] + (T << 5) + (T << 10) + (T << 12) + (T << 17).
C[i− 8] = c[i− 8] + (T >> 27) + (T >> 10) + (T >> 12) + (T >> 17).
end for{Reduce C[i]z32i modulo f(x)}
T = C[8] >> 27. {Extract bits 27− 31 of C[8]}
C[0] = C[0] + T + (T << 5) + (T << 7) + (T << 12).
C[8] = C[8]&0x7FFFFFF . {Clear the reduced bits of C[8]}
return (C[8], C[7], · · ·C[1], C[0]).
Note, C[i] is a 32-bit word of c(z), i.e. c(z) = (C[17], C[16], · · ·C[0]), which is at most
564-bit long. And the reduction result only consist of (C[8], C[7], · · ·C[0]), which has bit
width of 283. The reduction module is composed of shift registers, XORs, and AND gates.
Our reduction module can finish the computation in 4 clock cycles.
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4.5. Multiplier in GF(21132)
We use the Karatsuba multiplier presented by Keller et al. to implement the multiplier
in GF(21132) [23, 24]. It uses 9 283-bit multipliers and 22 XORs to implement one 1132-bit
multiplier. The architecture of Karatsuba multiplier is shown in Fig. 4.1. Using Karatsuba
multiplier can improve the performance of the Tate pairing computation. But it also increases
the chip area as it uses nine multipliers in GF(2283).
a1 b1a0 b0 a2 b2 a3 b3




Figure 4.1. Karatsuba Multiplier Architecture for GF(21132)
4.6. Exponentiation in GF(21132)
The final exponentiation of the Tate pairing computation is to compute c(x)2
2×283
−1,
where c(x) ∈ GF (21132). We divide it into two steps. The first step is to compute the
exponentiation of c(x)2
2×283
, the second step is to compute the inversion of c(x)−1 and then
multiply it with the exponentiation computed in the first step.
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The exponentiation can be computed using Frobenius map [30]. Let c(x) = c0 + c1x +
c2x
2 + c3x




= (c0 + c1) + (c2 + c3)x + (c1)x
2 + c3x
3
The exponentiation operation only requires addition and reordering of the coefficients. There-
fore, the exponentiation in GF(21132) can be implemented using the inverter in GF(21132)
and a few XORs.
4.7. Inverter in GF(2283)
Inversion is the most complex operation in Galois field arithmetic. It is based on Fermat’s
little theorem [16]. Let α be a nonzero element in GF(2283), then α−1 = α2
283
−2. We can see














According to equation (16), the inversion can be implemented using 282 squarings and
281 multiplications. Actually, the number of multiplications can be reduced due to the
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−1 = α · (tmp4)2
tmp6 = α2
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−1 = α · (tmp6)2
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where tmp1 to tmp11 are 283-bit registers used to store temporary data for the inversion
operations. We can see from equation (17) that the inversion only needs 11 multiplications
and 282 squarings.
4.8. Inverter in GF(21132)
The inverter in GF(21132) is the most complex unit among all the arithmetic units. It
can be implemented with one inverter in GF(2283), one multiplier in GF(21132), and one
exponentiation in GF(21132). The algorithm to compute inversion in GF(21132) is shown in
Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 is derived from equation (18) which was proposed in [30].
(18) α−1 = α2
4m
−2 = (αr)−1αr−1





αr ∈ GF(2m), α ∈ GF(24m).
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Algorithm 6 Inversion in GF(24m)
1: INPUT: α ∈ GF(24m).
2: OUTPUT: β = α−1, β ∈ GF(24m).




4: Compute αr = αr−1α.
5: Compute (αr)−1.
6: Compute β = (αr)−1αr−1.
7: return β.
Line 3 in Algorithm 6 can be computed as follows:






Thus, it can be implemented with three exponentiations in GF(21132) and two multiplications
in GF(21132).
Line 4 in Algorithm 6 is a multiplication in GF(21132). Line 5 is implemented with an
inverter in GF(2283) because αr ∈ GF(2283). Line 6 is also a multiplication in GF(21132). So
the entire inversion algorithm in GF(21132) can be implemented with one inverter in GF(2283),
one multiplier in GF(21132), and exponentiations in GF(21132).
4.9. Experimental Results
We first synthesize all the arithmetic units. The device utilization summary of the
individual arithmetic units is shown in Table 4.1. The inverse in GF(21132) is the most
complicated unit. It uses 33594 slices which accounts for 52% of the whole chip area. This
is because the inverse in GF(21132) consists of inverse in GF(2283) and multiplication in
GF(21132). Squaring uses the least area among all the arithmetic units.
From Table 4.1, we observe that the synthesis will not meet area constraints if we in-
stantiate inverter in GF(21132) as well as multiplier in GF(21132). Therefore, we share the
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multiplier in GF(21132) and inverter in GF(2283) to implement the inverter in GF(21132). By
doing so, the area constraints are met.
Table 4.1. Device utilization summary of Galois Field Arithmetic Units
Operation Max Freq. (MHz) # CLB Slices # FF # LUT
Mult. GF(2283) 246.670 1781 (2%) 2156 (1%) 3367 (2%)
Mult. GF(21132) 248.447 25955 (41%) 32578 (25%) 48591 (38%)
Squaring GF(2283) 675.676 306 (0.48%) 317 (0.25%) 567 (0.45%)
Reduction GF(2283) 346.981 787 (1%) 825 (0.65%) 1439 (1%)
Inverse GF(2283) 160.817 7354 (11%) 6999 (5%) 13944 (11%)
Inverse GF(21132) 122.592 33594 (52%) 43746 (34%) 54988 (43%)
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CHAPTER 5
ALGORITHMS, ARCHITECTURES AND IMPLEMENTATIONS OF ECC AND TATE
PAIRING
5.1. Algorithm for ECC
Point multiplication is to compute kP , where k is an integer and P is an point on an
elliptic curve E defined over a field Fq. Point multiplication is also called scalar multiplication,
and it dominates the execution time of elliptic curve cryptographic schemes. There are
several algorithms for point multiplication over elliptic curve. We will introduce two most
commonly used algorithms, i.e. right-to-left multiplication algorithm and Montgomery point
multiplication algorithm.
5.1.1. Right-to-left algorithm
The algorithm for point multiplication using right-to-left binary method is shown in
Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 Right-to-left Point Multiplication Algorithm.
INPUT: k = (kt−1, ...., k1, k0)2, P ∈ E(Fq).
OUTPUT: kP .
Q←∞.
for i from n− 2 to 0 do
if ki = 1 then
Q← Q + P .
end if





In our design, we use Montgomery point multiplication algorithm for the implementation
of point multiplication [19, 28, 43]. The pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 8.
Algorithm 8 Montgomery Point Multiplication Algorithm.
INPUT: An integer k = (kn−1, kn−2, · · ·k1, k0, kn−1 = 1), a point P (x, y) ∈ E(GF (2
m))
OUTPUT: Q = kP .
Set X1 = x, Z1 = 1, X2 = x
4 + b, Z2 = x
2
for i = n− 2 downto 0 do
if ki = 1 then
Pointadder(X1, Z1, X2, Z2), Pointdouble(X2, Z2)
else
Pointadder(X2, Z2, X1, Z1), Pointdouble(X1, Z1)
end if
end for
return Q = Mxy(X1, Z1, X2, Z2).
Note, “Pointadder” and “Pointdouble” in Algorithm 8 are computed using Equations (2) -
(5). Mxy is the function to convert the projective coordinates to affine coordinates [4]. Its
output, i.e., the coordinate of point Q, xk and yk can be computed as:
(20) xk = X1/Z1
(21) yk = (x + xk)[(y + x
2) + (X2/Z2 + x)(X1/Z1 + x)]× (1/x) + y
5.2. Architecture for ECC
5.2.1. Design Hierarchy
The design hierarchy of a typical elliptic curve cryptosystem is shown in Fig. 5.1. The
top level of the system contains cryptographic protocols. In an ECC based SSL connection,
the ECC based cipher suite uses ECDH for key exchange, and ECDSA for authentication of
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the public key. Point multiplication is utilized in both of the ECDH and ECDSA protocol.
The secondary level in the design hierarchy is point multiplication. Point multiplication is
composed of point doubling and point addition. Point multiplication, point doubling and
point addition are operations involving with the points on the elliptic curve. The bottom
level of the ECC system is Galois field arithmetic including Galois field multiplication, Galois
field inversion and Galois field squaring. Our design focuses on all but the protocol level of








Figure 5.1. Hierarchy of Typical Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem.
5.2.2. Top level architecture and point multiplication
The top level architecture of a typical elliptic curve cryptosystem is illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.2. It is composed of main controller, register files, and point multiplier. The main
controller is used to realize specific cryptographic protocols, such as ECDSA or ECDH.
Point multiplier consists of point adder, point doubler and conversion module. And its im-
plementation is our focus in this work. Details of the implementation of point multiplier is
described in the next section.
The diagram of the point multiplier is shown in Figure 5.3. Based on the Montgomery
point multiplication algorithm, the point multiplier is composed of point adder, point dou-
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Figure 5.3. Architecture of Point Multiplier.
We use two Galois field multipliers, one Galois field squarer and XORs to implement point
adder. Point doubler is composed of two Galois field squarers, one Galois field multiplier and
XORs. The coordinates converter is more complicated than point adder and point doubler.
It consists of two Galois field multipliers, one Galois field squarer, one Galois field inverter,
and XORs. In our work, all the arithmetic units are designed in GF(2283). The dataflows
of the point adder, point doubler, and coordinates converter are shown in Figure 5.4, 5.5,
and 5.6, respectively, where t1, t2, t3, t4 are 283-bit registers. The goal of our design is to
optimize the parallel processing of the Montgomery point multiplication. Meanwhile, our
design shares the arithmetic units in order to reduce chip area.
The block diagram of point multiplier is shown in Figure 5.7. One point double, one
point adder, one finite field inversion and two finite field multipliers are instantiated in the
point multiplier module. And the control unit controls the flow of the computation. The
point definition is shown in Table 5.1. The state diagram of the point multiplier is shown in
Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.5. Dataflow of Point Doubler
5.3. Experimental Results of ECC
We have implemented and simulated the elliptic curve point multiplication with Xilinx’s
FPGA device. In order to show the effectiveness of hardware implementation over software
based approach, we have also realized the design in software. We first provide the setups
used in our work, then compare our FPGA based design with several previous works, and
then show the difference between hardware and software implementations.
5.3.0.1. Software Implementation. The software implementation of the elliptic curve point
multiplication is done using C++ and LiDIA. LiDIA is a C++ library of computational num-

































Figure 5.7. Block Diagram of Point Multiplier for GF (2m)
and carried out on a Pentium4 2.8 GHz desktop with 1G memory. The source codes are
compiled by GCC 4.1.1. The running time to perform a single Tate pairing operation is 9.6
ms.
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Table 5.1. Port Definition of Point Multiplier
Name Direction Definition
clk input system clock
reset input system reset, low active
req input request signal for multiplication
k[M-1:0] input the integer for multiplication
x[M-1:0] input x coordinate of point on E in affine coordinates
y[M-1:0] input y coordinate of point on E in affine coordinates
ready output ready signal
x out[M-1:0] output output result in affine coordinates
y out[M-1:0] output output result in affine coordinates
5.3.1. FPGA Implementation
The hardware implementation is simulated by ModelSim XE and synthesized with Xilinx
ISE 8.2i. The target device is Xilinx Virtex 4 XC4VFX140-FF1517-11. The optimization
goal during synthesis is set as “speed”, and the optimization effort is set to “normal”.
5.3.1.1. Synthesis Results. We have synthesized all arithmetic units including point mul-
tiplication, point addition, point doubling. The device utilization summary of the individual
arithmetic units is shown in Table 5.2. Column “Max Freq.” lists the maximum frequency
to run each unit individually. The rest columns show the number of CLB slices, Flip-flops
(FF) and lookup-tables (LUT) used. The corresponding utility percentage is also given in
Table 5.2. The coordinates converter is the most complicated unit which accounts for 35%


















Figure 5.8. State Diagram of Point Multiplier for GF (2m)
5.3.1.2. Latency Comparison. We have simulated the elliptic curve point addition, point
doubling, coordinates converter and point multiplication in both software and hardware.
The simulated latencies for these operations are shown in Table 5.3. Here, latency is the
time to perform one specific arithmetic operation. The k values in our simulation have the
same number of 1’s and 0’s in the binary representation.
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Table 5.2. Device Utilization Summary of ECC.
Operation Max Freq. (MHz) # CLB Slices # FF # LUT
Point Addition GF(2283) 283.728 7412 (17%) 9016 (10%) 13826 (16%)
Point Doubling GF(2283) 281.861 5378 (12%) 6031 (7%) 10341 (12%)
Coordinates Converter 183.968 15009 (35%) 16129 (19%) 27753 (32%)
Point Multiplication GF(2283) 171.247 30001 (71%) 36142 (42%) 51094 (60%)
Table 5.3. Speedup of Hardware over Software.
Operation FPGA Freq. FPGA Latency Software Latency Speedup
Point Add GF(2283) 283.728 MHz 0.6 us 29 us 48
Point Double GF(2283) 281.861 MHz 0.41 us 21 us 51
Coord. Converter 183.968 MHz 24 us 58 us 2.4
Point Mult. GF(2283) 171.247 MHz 304 us 9600 us 31.6
According to Table 5.3, the FPGA implementation of the point multiplication is 31.6
times faster than the software implementation. We compare the simulated latency with
Leung’s [27] and Ernst’s work [12] and show the results in Table 5.4. Our FPGA implemen-
tation of the point multiplication is 47 times faster than that in Leung’s work (14.3 ms), and
22.5 times faster than that in Ernst’s work (6.85 ms).
5.4. Algorithm for Tate pairing
Tate pairing can be computed using Miller’s algorithm [33] or modified Miller’s algo-
rithms [5, 7, 26]. These algorithms are usually developed by mathematicians in number
theory. The algorithm we choose to compute Tate pairing is shown in Algorithm 9 [30].
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Table 5.4. Comparisons of Latency of Point Multiplication.
Design Key Size Latency
[27] 281 14.3 ms
[12] 270 6.85 ms
Our work 283 0.304 ms
This algorithm can be divided into four parts. The first part is initialization (line 1 to 3).
The second part is accumulation (line 5 to 18). The third part is squaring (line 19 to 20).
And the last part is exponentiation (line 22).
Using Algorithm 9, we compute Tate pairing for supersingular elliptic curve over GF(2m).
The inputs are two points P and Q on elliptic curve Eb. P, Q are m bits binary sequences.
The output is C(x). The coefficients of C(x), i.e. c3, c2, c1, c0, are the pairing results,
which are 4m-bit binary sequences in the multiplicative group of G2. And c3, c2, c1, c0 are
m-bit sequences. Based on the above discussion, we can figure out that the Tate pairing
computation requires at least Galois field multiplier in both GF(2m) and GF(24m), and
exclusive-or (XOR). Other operations such as squarer, exponentiation, and inverters are
optional. However, they can be utilized to improve the performance. In our implementation,
we use all of the above functional units.
5.5. Architecture for Tate pairing
5.5.1. Top Level
The top level architecture of Tate pairing is shown as Fig. 5.9. It is composed of the
main controller, register files, and arithmetic units. Main controller can be designed using
finite state machine (FSM) to control state transitions. Register files are implemented using
flip-flops available on the FPGA chip. Let m = 283, the arithmetic units we have designed
include multipliers in GF(2m) and GF(24m), exponentiation in GF(24m), inverter in GF(2m)
and GF(24m), squarer in GF(2m), reduction in GF(2m).
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Algorithm 9 Algorithm for Tate Pairing over GF(2m)
1: INPUT: P = (xp, yp), Q = (xq, yq)
2: OUTPUT: C(x)
3: INITIAL C(x) = c3x
3 + c2x
2 + c1x
1 + x1 = 1
4: for i = 1 to m do
5: xp = x2p, yp = y
2
p
6: z = xp + xq
7: m1 = xpxq
8: w = z + m1 + yp + yq + 1
9: m2 = c0w, m3 = (c2 + c3)(z + 1)
10: m4 = (c1 + c2 + c3)w
11: m5 = (c0 + c2 + c3)(w + z + 1)
12: m6 = c3(z + 1)
13: m7 = (c1 + c2)(w + z + 1)
14: c′0 = m2 + m3 + c3
15: c′1 = m2 + m4 + m5 + m6 + c0 + c3
16: c′2 = m2 + m4 + m5 + m7 + c1
17: c′3 = m4 + m7 + c2
18: c0 = c
′
0, c1 = c
′
1, c2 = c
′
2, c3 = c
′
3
19: xq = x
2m−1
q








The port definitions are shown in Table 5.5. The ports can be categorized as control
signals, data signals and system signals. Control signals include “req” and “ready”. Data
signals include xp, yp, xq, yq, cx, and r. The reduction polynomial r used in our design equals
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x283+x12+x7+x5+1, which is recommended by ANSI [19]. System signals include “clk” and
“reset”. The state diagram of Tate pairing computation is shown in Fig. 5.10. It consists of
states such as IDLE, ACCU (accumulation), SQUA (squaring), EXP(exponentiation), and












Figure 5.9. Top Level Architecture for Tate Pairing in GF (2m)
Table 5.5. Port Definitions of Tate Pairing Module
Name Direction Definition
clk input system clock
reset input system reset, low active
req input request signal
xp[M-1:0] input x coordinate of point P
yp[M-1:0] input y coordinate of point P
xq[M-1:0] input x coordinate of point Q
yq[M-1:0] input y coordinate of point Q
r[M-1:0] input reduction polynomial
ready output ready signal









Figure 5.10. State Diagram of Tate Pairing Computation
5.5.2. Architecture of Arithmetic Units
The architecture of the arithmetic units in our design is shown in Fig. 5.11. This ar-
chitecture is designed in such a way that we can share functional units to minimize chip
area. The majority of operations are carried out in GF(2283). So from this point on, an
arithmetic unit will be in GF(2283) by default unless specified otherwise. We use two multi-
pliers (MUL), two squarers (SQU), an inverter (INV) in GF(21132), an inverter in GF(2283),
one multiplier in GF(21132), and XORs to implement the arithmetic units. Fig. 5.11 also
illustrates the hierarchy of the arithmetic units. The inverter in GF(21132) is the most com-
plex unit, and it consists of one inverter in GF(2283) and one multiplier in GF(21132). The
inverter in GF(2283) is composed of one multiplier and one squarer. We adopt the Karatsuba
multiplier for GF(21132), which is implemented with nine multipliers in GF(2283) [24]. The
multiplier is a digit serial multiplier [19], and it consists of a reduction module to reduce
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the degree to 283. Both the squarers and adders can be computed in one clock cycle in our
implementation.
We use two multipliers and two squarers because they optimizes the parallel computation
in the accumulation part and squaring part of the Tate pairing algorithm. The dataflow of
the accumulation part of the Tate pairing algorithm is shown in Fig 5.12. For the squaring
part, two squarers are also optimal because xq and yq can be squared simultaneously. In
the finial exponentiation part, we use Frobenius map and one inverter in GF(21132). But
we do not really instantiate the inverter in GF(21132). Instead, we share the inverter in
GF(2283) and multiplier in GF(21132) to implement the inverter in GF(21132). The detailed






















Figure 5.11. Architecture of Arithmetic Units
5.6. Experimental Results of Tate Pairing
5.6.1. Software Implementation
The software implementation of the Tate pairing computation is done using C++ and
LiDIA. LiDIA is a C++ library for computational number theory [2]. We simulate the Tate
pairing computation over GF(2283) based on Algorithm 9 on a Pentium4 2.8GHz computer
with 1G memory. The source codes are compiled by GCC 4.1.1. The running time to perform



















































Figure 5.12. Dataflow for Accumulation of Tate Pairing
5.6.2. FPGA Implementation
The hardware implementation of Tate pairing is written in Verilog. The designs are
simulated using Modelsim XE and synthesized using Xilinx ISE 8.2i. The target device is
Xilinx Virtex 4 XC4VFX140-FF1517-11. The optimization goal of the synthesis is set as
speed, and the optimization effort is set to normal.
5.6.2.1. Synthesis Results. We first synthesize all the arithmetic units. The device uti-
lization summary of the individual arithmetic units is shown in Table 5.6. The inverse in
GF(21132) is the most complicated unit. It uses 33594 slices which accounts for 52% of the
whole chip area. This is because the inverse in GF(21132) consists of inverse in GF(2283) and
multiplication in GF(21132). Squaring uses the least area among all the arithmetic units.
Table 5.6. Device Utilization Summary of Tate Pairing
Operation Max Freq. (MHz) # CLB Slices # FF # LUT
Tate pairing GF(2283) 159.758 55844 (88%) 57753 (45%) 104860 (83%)
52
Then we synthesize the Tate pairing computation with these arithmetic units. The device
summary for Tate pairing computation is also shown in Table 5.6.
5.6.2.2. Latency Comparison. We have simulated all arithmetic units to evaluate the
latency for each operation. Here, latency is the time to perform one specific arithmetic
operation. In order to compare the latency of our work with that of McCusker’s work [30],
we also set the simulation frequency as 250 MHz. The latency of each arithmetic unit is
shown in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7. Latency Comparisons of Arithmetic Units
Operation Latency of [30] Latency of our work Speedup
Mult. GF(2283) 897 ns 218 ns 4.11
Mult. GF(21132) 940 ns 254 ns 3.7
Squaring GF(2283) 4 ns 4 ns 1
Inverse GF(2283) 10769 ns 5758 ns 1.87
Inverse GF(21132) 14666 ns 6518 ns 2.25
According to Table 5.7, on average, our work is 2.6 times faster than McCusker’s work [30].
We also estimated latency of our implementation based on the model proposed by Keller [24].
We compare the estimated latencies with Keller’s [24] and McCusker’s work [30] and show
the results in Table 5.8. This is 2.5 times faster than that in Keller’s work (1.48 ms), and 1.4
times faster than that in McCusker’s work (0.84 ms). In addition, the latency of our FPGA
based implementation is 152 times faster than that of software implementation (90 ms).
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Table 5.8. Comparisons of Estimated Latency of Tate Pairing
Latency Speedup over software
[24] 1.48 60
[30] 0.84 ms 107
Our work 0.59 ms 152
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Elliptic curve cryptography and Tate pairing are new techniques in public key cryptogra-
phy. ECC is an efficient substitution to RSA, which is one of the most commonly used public
key cryptography schemes nowadays. ECC has shorter key sizes with the same security level
compared to RSA. Shorter key sizes will save power, bandwidth, and improve performance.
Tate pairing is used for identity based cryptosystem. Using Tate pairing, the public key can
be derived from the identity information without issuing certificates.
Both ECC and Tate pairing are built upon Galois field arithmetics. Because they are very
computationally expensive, we used FPGA to implement them. Through parallel processing
and resource sharing, the performances are improved greatly compared to their software
implementations. FPGA also has the advantage of flexibility compared to traditional ASIC
implementations.
In this thesis, we study hardware implementation of elliptic curve point multiplication to
speedup secure web transactions. We propose an FPGA based implementation in GF(2283)
optimizing the dataflow due to data dependency. Our implementation is significantly faster
than those previous works presented in the literature. We also compared the FPGA im-
plementation with its software implementation. The experimental results show that the
hardware based implementation can improve the latency by a factor of 31.
In addition to ECC, we also explored hardware implementation of Tate pairing. We
proposed an FPGA based implementation for Tate pairing computation in GF(2283). Ex-
perimental results show that, on average, the arithmetic units in our work run 2.6 times
faster than in previous work [30]. The estimated latency of our implementation is 1.4 times
faster than that in [30], and 2.5 times faster than that in [24]. We also compared the
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FPGA implementation with its software implementation. The results show that the FPGA
implementation can speedup the latency by a factor of 152.
In this research, all of our designs are implemented using Verilog and synthesized using
Xilinx ISE tool. Our target device is Xilinx Virtex 4 XC4VFX140-FF1517-11. We also
performed all the simulations using Modelsim.
In our future research, we have several directions: Firstly, we will download our syn-
thesized netlists onto FPGA chips and measure performance in real hardware environment.
Secondly, we plan to integrate our designs into real applications such as VoIP, RFID and
so on. Thirdly, we plan to extend our current cryptosystem into prime field and arbitrary
key sizes. Finally, we plan to design a hybrid processor which combines both ECC and Tate
pairing together. The hybrid processor can be reconfigured to realize specific cryptography
schemes such as elliptic curve digital signature, identity based encryption. FPGA’s flexibility
makes it possible to design this kind of reconfigurable hybrid cryptosystem.
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